Property Dualism
Explore the view that while there is only one kind of substance (physical), there are two distinct kinds of properties: physical and mental, for example, qualia.
About This Topic
Explore the view that while there is only one kind of substance (physical), there are two distinct kinds of properties: physical and mental, for example, qualia.
Key Questions
- Explain the concept of 'qualia' and why it poses a challenge for physicalism.
- Analyse the 'philosophical zombies' argument for property dualism.
- Evaluate the knowledge argument (Mary's room) as a defence of non-physical properties.
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