Active learning ideas
Eliminative Materialism, championed by Patricia and Paul Churchland, is the most radical physicalist position. It argues that our common-sense 'folk psychology' (beliefs, desires, hopes) is a fundamentally flawed theory that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. In this view, 'beliefs' don't actually exist any more than 'caloric fluid' or 'phlogiston' did.
Activity 01
Students try to explain a simple action (e.g., 'buying a sandwich') using only 'folk psychology' (beliefs/desires). They then try to explain it using only 'brain states'. This highlights the 'theoretical' nature of our everyday talk.
Is folk psychology an outdated and inaccurate scientific theory?
Activity 02
Stations show 'theories' that were proven wrong (e.g., flat earth, miasma, witches). Students discuss whether 'beliefs and desires' belong in this graveyard or if they are fundamentally different from scientific theories.
Do beliefs and desires actually exist?
Activity 03
One side argues that to 'believe' eliminativism is true, you must have a 'belief', which the theory says doesn't exist. The other side must defend the theory using the Churchlands' responses.
Is eliminative materialism self-refuting?
A few notes on teaching this unit
Watch Out for These Misconceptions
Eliminativism is just a 'mean' version of identity theory.
Identity theory says beliefs *are* brain states; eliminativism says beliefs *don't exist at all*. Using a 'Keep, Change, or Bin' sorting activity helps students distinguish between reduction and elimination.
If eliminativism is true, we are just robots.
It doesn't deny we are complex; it just says our 'labels' for that complexity are wrong. Peer-led discussion on 'the future of language' helps students imagine a world without folk-psychological terms.
Methods used in this brief
Philosophical Behaviourism
Students analyse hard and soft behaviourism, focusing on Hempel and Ryle. They will evaluate whether mental states can be entirely reduced to behavioural dispositions.
8 methodologies
Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
An investigation into the claim that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. Students will consider arguments regarding multiple realisability.
8 methodologies
Functionalism
A study of functionalism as an alternative to identity theory and behaviourism. Students will examine how mental states are defined by their functional roles and evaluate the 'inverted spectrum' objection.
8 methodologies