Active learning ideas
Functionalism defines mental states by their functional role, what they *do*, rather than what they are made of. A mental state is a link between an input (a stimulus), other mental states, and an output (a behaviour). This allows for 'multiple realisability', meaning a computer or an alien could have a 'mind' if it performs the right functions.
Activity 01
Each student is given a simple 'function' (e.g., 'if you see a red card, pass a blue card to the left'). Together, the class 'processes' an input to produce an output. They then discuss whether the 'class' as a whole has a mental state.
Can mental states be defined solely by their inputs, internal transitions, and outputs?
Activity 02
Groups map out Ned Block's thought experiment where the population of China acts as neurons in a giant brain. They must debate whether this 'system' could actually feel pain or if it's just a 'simulation' of a mind.
Does functionalism successfully avoid the multiple realisability objection?
Activity 03
Students imagine two people who behave identically but one sees 'red' where the other sees 'green'. They discuss whether functionalism can account for this difference in 'qualia' if the 'function' remains the same.
How does the 'China brain' thought experiment challenge functionalism?
A few notes on teaching this unit
Watch Out for These Misconceptions
Functionalism is just behaviourism.
Behaviourism only looks at input/output; functionalism includes the 'internal' links between mental states. Using a 'flowchart' activity helps students see the 'internal' complexity that behaviourism lacks.
Functionalism says computers *are* minds.
It says they *could be* if they were complex enough. Peer-led research into 'Strong AI' vs 'Weak AI' helps students refine their understanding of this possibility.
Methods used in this brief
Philosophical Behaviourism
Students analyse hard and soft behaviourism, focusing on Hempel and Ryle. They will evaluate whether mental states can be entirely reduced to behavioural dispositions.
8 methodologies
Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
An investigation into the claim that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. Students will consider arguments regarding multiple realisability.
8 methodologies
Eliminative Materialism
Students explore Churchland's argument that folk psychology is a false theory and that mental states do not exist. They will evaluate the counter-intuitive nature of this stance.
8 methodologies