Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory
An investigation into the claim that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. Students will consider arguments regarding multiple realisability.
About This Topic
An investigation into the claim that mental states are ontologically reducible to brain states. Students will consider arguments regarding multiple realisability.
Key Questions
- Are mental states identical to specific neurophysiological states?
- How does the multiple realisability of mental states challenge identity theory?
- Can physicalism account for the subjective nature of experience?
More in Metaphysics of Mind: Physicalism and Functionalism
Philosophical Behaviourism
Students analyse hard and soft behaviourism, focusing on Hempel and Ryle. They will evaluate whether mental states can be entirely reduced to behavioural dispositions.
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Eliminative Materialism
Students explore Churchland's argument that folk psychology is a false theory and that mental states do not exist. They will evaluate the counter-intuitive nature of this stance.
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Functionalism
A study of functionalism as an alternative to identity theory and behaviourism. Students will examine how mental states are defined by their functional roles and evaluate the 'inverted spectrum' objection.
2 methodologies