Property Dualism
Students explore the view that mental properties are non-physical properties arising from physical substances. The topic covers Chalmers' 'philosophical zombies' and Jackson's 'knowledge argument'.
About This Topic
Students explore the view that mental properties are non-physical properties arising from physical substances. The topic covers Chalmers' 'philosophical zombies' and Jackson's 'knowledge argument'.
Key Questions
- Is a philosophical zombie logically possible?
- Did Mary learn something new when she saw the colour red?
- Can physicalism adequately explain qualia?
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