Philosophy · Year 13 · Metaphysics of Mind: Dualism · 3.º Período

Property Dualism

Students explore the view that mental properties are non-physical properties arising from physical substances. The topic covers Chalmers' 'philosophical zombies' and Jackson's 'knowledge argument'.

TL;DR:Property Dualism suggests that while there is only one physical substance (the brain), it possesses two distinct types of properties: physical and mental. This topic focuses on the 'hard problem of consciousness' and the existence of qualia, the subjective 'feel' of experiences. Students engage with famous thought experiments like David Chalmers' 'philosophical zombies' and Frank Jackson's 'Mary the scientist'.

• National Curriculum Attainment Targets
• AQA A-Level Philosophy 7172: 3.2.2.1 Property dualism
• DfE Philosophy AS and A-level subject content: Metaphysics of mind

About This Topic

Property Dualism suggests that while there is only one physical substance (the brain), it possesses two distinct types of properties: physical and mental. This topic focuses on the 'hard problem of consciousness' and the existence of qualia, the subjective 'feel' of experiences. Students engage with famous thought experiments like David Chalmers' 'philosophical zombies' and Frank Jackson's 'Mary the scientist'.

This topic is essential for students to understand the limits of physicalism (the view that everything is physical). It aligns with National Curriculum targets for evaluating complex metaphysical theories. Students grasp this concept faster through structured discussion and peer explanation, as thought experiments are designed to be debated and 'run' in the mind to see if the conclusions follow.

Key Questions

1. Is a philosophical zombie logically possible?
2. Did Mary learn something new when she saw the colour red?
3. Can physicalism adequately explain qualia?

Watch Out for These Misconceptions

Common Misconception

Property dualists believe in ghosts or souls.

What to Teach Instead

They are usually 'physicalists' about substance but not about properties. Using a 'computer hardware vs software' analogy (carefully) can help students see how one thing can have different types of features.

Common Misconception

Mary learns a new 'fact' in the same way she learns a math formula.

What to Teach Instead

The debate is whether she learns a 'propositional fact' or just an 'ability' or 'acquaintance'. Peer-teaching the three types of knowledge helps students refine their evaluation of Jackson's argument.

Active Learning Ideas

Simulation Game

Mary's Room

Students are given a 'black and white' description of a physical process (e.g., how a tomato reflects light). They must then 'step out' of the description and describe the actual experience of seeing red, debating whether the experience adds new knowledge.

30 min·Small Groups

Formal Debate

The Zombie Apocalypse

Students debate whether a 'philosophical zombie' (a being physically identical to a human but with no internal consciousness) is logically possible. This forces them to consider if consciousness is 'extra' to physical facts.

40 min·Whole Class

Think-Pair-Share

What is it like to be a bat?

Based on Nagel's famous paper, students try to describe the 'qualia' of sonar. They then discuss with a partner why a complete physical description of a bat's brain still wouldn't tell us what it 'feels' like to be one.

20 min·Pairs

Frequently Asked Questions

What are 'qualia'?

Qualia are the subjective, first-person 'raw feels' of experience, such as the redness of a rose, the smell of coffee, or the sting of pain. Property dualists argue these cannot be reduced to physical brain states.

What is the 'Knowledge Argument'?

Frank Jackson's argument that if Mary knows all the physical facts about colour but learns something new when she actually sees red, then physicalism is false because there are non-physical facts (qualia).

How can active learning help students understand property dualism?

Property dualism relies heavily on 'intuition pumps' like Mary's Room. Active learning allows students to 'inhabit' these thought experiments, making the distinction between 'knowing about' and 'experiencing' a lived classroom reality rather than just a textbook definition.

What is a 'philosophical zombie'?

A hypothetical being that is physically and behaviourally identical to a human but has no conscious experience (no 'inner light'). If they are possible, it suggests consciousness is not just a byproduct of physical matter.