Philosophy · Year 12 · Moral Philosophy: Meta-ethics · 5.º Período

Moral Realism

An introduction to the view that moral properties exist mind-independently. Students will evaluate ethical naturalism and non-naturalism (Moore's intuitionism).

TL;DR:Moral Realism is the meta-ethical view that moral properties exist mind-independently; when we say 'murder is wrong', we are stating a fact about the world. Students explore Ethical Naturalism (the idea that moral facts are just natural facts, like 'happiness') and Non-Naturalism (the idea that moral facts are unique, non-physical properties).

• National Curriculum Attainment Targets
• AQA 7172: Moral Philosophy 3.2.3.1

About This Topic

Moral Realism is the meta-ethical view that moral properties exist mind-independently; when we say 'murder is wrong', we are stating a fact about the world. Students explore Ethical Naturalism (the idea that moral facts are just natural facts, like 'happiness') and Non-Naturalism (the idea that moral facts are unique, non-physical properties).

A key focus of this unit is G.E. Moore's 'Naturalistic Fallacy' and his 'Open Question Argument', which challenge the idea that 'good' can be defined by natural terms. This topic is essential for students to understand the 'objectivity' debate in ethics. Students grasp this concept faster through structured discussion and peer explanation of whether 'goodness' can be seen under a microscope.

Key Questions

1. Are moral facts objective features of the world?
2. What is the naturalistic fallacy?
3. How does intuitionism explain our knowledge of moral truths?

Watch Out for These Misconceptions

Common Misconception

Students often think 'Naturalism' means 'environmentally friendly'.

What to Teach Instead

In meta-ethics, Naturalism means that moral properties are 'natural' properties (like pleasure or evolution). Active sorting of 'natural' vs 'non-natural' properties helps students use the term correctly in a philosophical context.

Common Misconception

Students think Moore's 'Intuitionism' is just about having a 'hunch'.

What to Teach Instead

For Moore, intuition is a form of rational 'seeing' of a self-evident truth. Peer-led comparisons between 'seeing red' and 'seeing goodness' help students understand Moore's claim that 'good' is a simple, unanalysable property.

Active Learning Ideas

Inquiry Circle

The Open Question Argument

Students are given definitions like 'Good = what people desire'. They must apply Moore's test: 'I know it is desired, but is it good?'. If the question still makes sense, the definition has failed. They try this with 5 different 'natural' definitions.

30 min·Small Groups

Think-Pair-Share

Is Morality like Science?

Students discuss whether 'Murder is wrong' is the same kind of fact as 'Water boils at 100 degrees'. They list the similarities and differences and share with the class.

15 min·Pairs

Gallery Walk

Naturalism vs Intuitionism

Stations explain Moore's 'Yellow' analogy (Intuitionism) and Mill's 'Desirable' argument (Naturalism). Students move around and vote on which theory better explains how we 'know' what is right.

35 min·Small Groups

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Naturalistic Fallacy?

G.E. Moore argued that it is a mistake to define 'good' (a non-natural property) in terms of 'natural' properties like pleasure, desire, or evolution. He claimed 'good' is simple and cannot be broken down into other things.

What is Ethical Naturalism?

It is the view that moral facts are natural facts. For example, a Naturalist might say that 'good' is simply 'that which leads to the survival of the species' or 'that which causes pleasure'. These are things we can observe in the natural world.

How can active learning help students understand Moral Realism?

Meta-ethics is notoriously abstract. Active learning strategies like 'The Fact-Value Sorter', where students have to categorize statements as 'Scientific Fact', 'Subjective Preference', or 'Moral Fact', help them visualize the 'Realist' claim that moral statements belong in the 'Fact' category.

What is Moore's 'Open Question Argument'?

Moore argued that for any natural definition of good (e.g., 'Good is pleasure'), it always makes sense to ask 'But is pleasure good?'. Because the question remains 'open' and not a tautology, the definition must be wrong.